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Since its inception in 1990, the Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS) has been used by the federal and state governments to store 
millions of people’s DNA data. Initially, CODIS was not in 
widespread use; few states participated, and the federal government 
could collect DNA only from those convicted of certain violent 
crimes.1 Today, however, the picture has changed drastically—some 
state governments, and now the federal government, require DNA 
samples upon arrest;2 a federal officer has no discretion in determining 
                                                 
∗ Editor-in-Chief, Chicago-Kent Law Review 2007–2008; J.D. candidate, May 
2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; M.S. 
(Chemistry), University of Washington, May 2005; B.S. (Chemistry), University of 
Washington, May 2002. The author wishes to thank the Fender family (Steve, Lynn, 
Erin, Jeremy, and Quintin) and Adam Augustyn for their constant love and 
support—the author can only hope she’s returned the favor. 
1 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
2 In the federal government, see the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-162, § 1001, 119 Stat. 2960, 3084. State governments requiring DNA upon 
arrest include, at the present time, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, California, New 
Mexico, and Kansas. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE 
§ 411.1471(a)(2) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 296(a)(2)(C) (2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3-10 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-
2511(e)(1) (2007). Some of these states require a DNA sample from anyone arrested 
1
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whether a person should provide a sample;3 and the list of “qualifying 
offenses” that require DNA collection continues to grow.4 As a result, 
more than 4.9 million individual DNA profiles are now available 
through CODIS.5 
DNA collection is undoubtedly a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.6 Moreover, it is a search that occurs without the two 
touchstones typically used to guarantee the reasonableness of a search: 
a warrant, and probable cause. Not only is there no probable cause, 
there is no cause whatsoever—every circuit has evaluated the 
constitutionality of DNA collection statutes, and every circuit has 
implicitly or explicitly found that the searches take place absent any 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.7 The Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed DNA collection statutes, but since the statutes 
require collection without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, 
lower courts have been guided by the Supreme Court’s “suspicionless 
search” jurisprudence. 
Applying the Court’s suspicionless search law can be difficult. 
The Court has, at various times, evaluated the constitutionality of such 
searches using one of two methods: the “totality of the circumstances,” 
or (the term I will use hereafter for brevity’s sake) “reasonableness” 
test; and the “special needs” test. Both frameworks permit the 
                                                                                                                   
for a felony (e.g., New Mexico) whereas others require the sample only if one is 
arrested for certain violent felonies (e.g., Virginia and Louisiana). 
3 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (“The court shall order, as 
an explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant cooperate in the 
collection of a DNA sample . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2). 
4 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d). The Justice For All Act requires all felons to provide 
a sample. 
5 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) 
Brochure, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab /codis/codis_brochures.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 
2007). 
6 Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that taking a DNA 
sample is “clearly a search”); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (“There is no question that the compulsory extraction of blood for DNA 
profiling constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”) 
(citations omitted). 
7 See sources cited infra note 69. 
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searching party to forego the warrant and probable-cause requirements 
in limited circumstances, when the government’s interests outweigh 
the individual’s privacy interests. The “special needs” test, however, 
first requires the searching party to identify a need “beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement” that would justify the lack of a warrant or 
probable cause. 
Only the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits use a special needs 
analysis to evaluate DNA collection statutes.8 The Seventh Circuit first 
addressed this issue in the 2004 case Green v. Berge,9 when it 
interpreted a Wisconsin state statute allowing for DNA collection from 
state prison inmates. After acknowledging that DNA collection is a 
search under the Fourth Amendment,10 the court noted that DNA 
collection may still be reasonable if it falls under one of the exceptions 
to the probable-cause requirement.11 The court found that collecting 
DNA samples from state prison inmates constituted a “special need”— 
a need beyond the normal need for law enforcement—and, as such, it 
was an exception to the rule.12 In doing so, the court ignored a number 
of other circuits that analyzed state or federal DNA statutes under the 
reasonableness test. The Fourth Circuit, for example, had already not 
only applied the reasonableness test, but explicitly overruled a lower 
court’s use of the special needs test.13 
But although explicit reasoning would be nice, the Seventh 
Circuit was free to take the path less traveled. Because the Supreme 
Court’s suspicionless search case law is fact-specific, dense, and at 
times seems contradictory; and because the Court has yet to address 
any DNA collection statute; disagreement amongst the circuits was to 
be expected and perhaps even encouraged. 
 
                                                 
8 United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007) (listing courts). 
9 354 F.3d at 675. 
10 Id. at 676 (stating that taking a DNA sample is “clearly a search”); see 
Johnson, 440 F.3d at 493. 
11 Green, 354 F.3d at 677. 
12 Id. 
13 Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992). 
3
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It is not the Green opinion that is surprising; it is the Seventh 
Circuit’s next DNA case, United States v. Hook,14 that is truly 
amazing. There, the court relied on Green and applied the special 
needs test, this time to the collection of DNA from a federal felon on 
supervised release. Hook, a white collar criminal, had agreed to certain 
terms as part of his supervised release conditions. This included an 
obligation that he “follow the instructions of the probation officer.”15 
When his probation officer scheduled him for DNA collection, as 
recently required by federal law,16 Hook refused, arguing that the 
search was unconstitutional.17 Hook had not explicitly consented to 
DNA collection, but since his probation officer requested that he do 
so, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that his probation agreement required 
him to submit to the search.18 As in Green, the Seventh Circuit 
evaluated that collection under the special needs approach.19 The court 
spent all of one sentence on that choice, simply noting that “[w]hile 
some circuits have employed a reasonableness standard” the court had 
“employed the ‘special needs’ approach in Green and will do the same 
here.”20 
This would, of course, be an entirely predictable outcome, were it 
not for the fact that both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit 
had, in the intervening period, effectively shut the door on the special 
needs test for the type of search at issue here. 
First, more than a year and a half prior to Hook, the Seventh 
Circuit handed down two opinions addressing suspicionless searches 
of probationers.21 In United States v. Barnett, the court addressed a 
                                                 
14 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006). 
15 Id. at 769-70. 
16 See sources cited supra notes 3 and 4. 
17 Hook, 471 F.3d at 771-72. 
18 Id. at 770. 
19 Id. at 773. 
20 Id. (citation omitted). 
21 The Supreme Court has explained the difference between probationers and 
parolees (which are called “supervised releasees” in the federal system). A parolee is 
released from prison prior to completing his sentence, and that release is conditioned 
upon abiding by certain rules. In contrast, a probationer serves probation time 
4
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Fourth Amendment challenge by a probationer who had signed an 
agreement consenting to suspicionless searches as a condition of his 
probation.22 The court held that a plea-bargained agreement was a type 
of contract; consent to the contract terms operated to effectively waive 
any Fourth Amendment rights the probationer once had.23 This opinion 
was quickly followed by United States v. Hagenow, where the court 
not only reaffirmed its adherence to Barnett, but also specifically 
disclaimed the use of the special needs test in analyzing these 
searches.24 
These two opinions anticipated with surprising accuracy the 
Supreme Court’s most recent suspicionless search holding. In Samson 
v. California, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a 
parolee if the parolee consented to searches as part of his parole 
agreement.25 The Court flatly refused to apply the special needs 
approach;26 instead, it held that under “general Fourth Amendment 
principles” a parolee that signed a consent-to-search waiver greatly 
reduced his expectation of privacy, and therefore a police officer 
would not need reasonable suspicion prior to conducting a search.27 
The Hook court, however, failed to mention Barnett, Hagenow, or 
Samson—despite the fact that these three cases directly speak to the 
Hook facts. As in those three cases, Hook dealt with the suspicionless 
search of a parolee or a probationer, and Hook in effect dealt with the 
effect of a consent-to-search term in a supervised release 
                                                                                                                   
outside a penitentiary instead of being imprisoned. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 
2193, 2198 (“Federal supervised release . . . in contrast to probation, is meted out in 
addition, not in lieu of, incarceration.”) (quoting United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 
446, 461 (2d Cir. 2002)). Because of this difference, parolees often enjoy fewer 
rights than probationers, and parole is “more akin” to prison than probation. Id. at 
2198 & n.2; see also text and accompanying sources cited infra note 82. 
22 415 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005). 
23 Id. at 692-93. 
24 423 F.3d 638, 642-43 (7th Cir. 2005). 
25 Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2202. 
26 Id. at 2199 n.3. 
27 Id. at 2196, 2199. 
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agreement28—yet the Hook court made use of an analytical framework 
that had been explicitly disclaimed by a previous Seventh Circuit 
panel and by the Supreme Court. 
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit has improperly 
applied the special needs test to suspicionless DNA searches. Instead, 
such searches should be governed by the reasonableness test used in 
Samson. Further, regardless of which analytical framework a court has 
adopted, courts have almost universally held that DNA collection 
statutes do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure 
clause.29 This Comment will show that the Seventh Circuit failed to 
consider factors unique to DNA collection when it balanced the 
individual and governmental interests at stake. A careful 
reconsideration of the weight given to these interests is needed, and 
this may ultimately require the court to change its stance on the 
constitutionality of DNA collection for probationers and parolees. 
Part I(A) of this Comment provides an overview of CODIS, the 
various DNA techniques used in forensic sciences, and the expansion 
of the CODIS database through recent changes in federal law. Part 
I(B) explains what aspects of DNA collection implicate Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure law. Part II(A) briefly describes the 
balancing inquiries required for the special needs and reasonableness 
frameworks, while Part II(B) traces the evolution of the 
reasonableness and special needs tests through the Supreme Court’s 
suspicionless search jurisprudence. Part III(A) looks to the Seventh 
Circuit’s early suspicionless search opinions to provide some historical 
basis in the law. Part III(B) provides a detailed analysis of the Seventh 
Circuit’s DNA cases, Green and Hook, and Part III(C) provides an in-
depth look at the waiver issue described in Barnett and Hagenow. Part 
III(D) dissects the Supreme Court’s Samson case, and concludes that 
post-Samson, the Seventh Circuit improperly employed the special 
needs framework instead of the reasonableness test in Hook. Finally, 
                                                 
28 See infra text in Section III(B)(2) for an explanation of how the consent term 
was incorporated into Hook’s supervised release agreement. 
29 See Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01 Civ. 7891, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1621, at 
*24-25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003) (collecting cases). 
6
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Part IV argues that the Seventh Circuit should adopt the 
reasonableness framework, and that when it does so the court must 
reconsider not only the relative weight given to individual and 
governmental interests, but also the very nature of the search at issue 
in DNA collection. This Part seeks to provides some guidance to those 
considerations for the Seventh Circuit as it moves forward with DNA 
collection challenges. 
 
I. CODIS – A BRIEF HISTORY 
 
A. CODIS and DNA Collection 
 
DNA. Incredibly, that small acronym contains the key to a 
person’s identity. DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is a double-stranded 
molecule contained in every nucleated cell30 in a person’s body—and 
despite the fact that DNA is not visible to the naked eye, this tiny 
molecule contains a person’s entire genetic blueprint. Each person, 
with the exception of identical twins,31 has a DNA sequence which is 
completely unique. As such, DNA allows investigators to accurately 
                                                 
30 A nucleated cell is a cell that contains a nucleus. Human red blood cells do 
not contain nuclei, and therefore are not useful for standard DNA testing. White 
blood cells, skin cells, saliva, semen, and hair that has been forcefully removed and 
still has the follicle attached can all be tested for DNA; on occasion, even urine, 
feces, and vaginal secretions may contain the cells necessary for testing. 
31 Identical twins are genetically identical, at least at birth. Despite the fact that 
identical twins have the same DNA, they may evidence physical differences such as 
varying susceptibilities to disease. These differences may occur, at least in part, 
because of differences in genetic expression. Mario F. Fraga et al., Epigenetic 
Differences Arise During the Lifetime of Monozygotic Twins, 102 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 10604, 10604 (2005). Although genetically-identical individuals may 
seem rare, identical twins actually account for about one in every 250 live births. Id. 
(citing JUDITH G. HALL & E. LOPEZ-RANGEL, TWINS AND TWINNING 395-404 (A. E. 
H. Emery & D. L. Rimoin eds., 1966)). It is interesting to note that although current 
forensic DNA analysis cannot differentiate between identical twins, the tried-and-
true method of fingerprinting can. Anil K. Jain et al., On the Similarity of Identical 
Twin Fingerprints, 35 PATTERN RECOGNITION 2653 (2002). 
7
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identify suspects in criminal cases by “matching” the DNA evidence 
left at a crime scene to one particular person.32 
As techniques were invented that allowed labs to test even the 
smallest amounts of DNA,33 courts began admitting DNA evidence 
                                                 
32 Forensic DNA technology has changed drastically over time. Sir Alec 
Jeffreys’ article, infra note 33, described restriction fragment length polymorphism 
(RFLP) techniques, where DNA is cleaved by special enzymes to produce DNA 
fragments that have repeating sequences. The number of these repeating sequences 
varies between individuals, so if a person’s DNA is cleaved using multiple enzymes, 
a unique pattern of different fragment lengths should emerge. These fragments can 
be imaged using various size-dependent separation techniques. NAT’L INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 5-6 (2002), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf; Phillip Jones, DNA 
Forensics: From RFLP to PCR-STR and Beyond, FORENSIC MAG., Fall 2004. RFLP 
analysis requires a relatively substantial amount of DNA, however, and the DNA 
cannot be degraded prior to testing (as often occurs when the DNA sample is 
exposed to heat or light). C. R. Thacker et al., An Investigation into Methods to 
Produce Artificially Degraded DNA, 1288 INT’L CONGRESS SERIES 592, 592-93 
(2006) (describing DNA degradation). To overcome the problems inherent to RFLP 
analysis, laboratories now use the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which allows 
them to take a small amount of DNA and copy it to create a sizeable sample, in 
combination with the short tandem repeat (STR) technology that came onto the 
scene in the early 1990s. See Jones, supra, and sources cited infra note 33. Like 
RFLP, STR involves the identification of specific locations (called “loci”) on a DNA 
chain that repeat; these repeats are shorter (up to seven base pairs, as compared to 
the six to 100 found in RFLP), so PCR amplification works better. Jones, supra. The 
FBI requires thirteen different loci to “match” a suspect to a DNA profile, which 
theoretically ensures that a false match is nearly impossible (at least one-in-a-
billion). NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra, at 6. 
33 To briefly trace some highlights in the evolution of DNA amplification 
techniques, see Arlene R. Wyman & Ray White, A Highly Polymorphic Locus in 
Human DNA, 77 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6754 (1980); Alec J. Jeffreys, Victoria 
Wilson & Swee Lay Thein, Hypervariable ‘Minisatellite’ Regions in Human DNA, 
314 NATURE 67 (1985); Kary B. Mullis & Fred A. Faloona, Specific Synthesis of 
DNA in vitro via a Polymerase-catalyzed Chain Reaction, 155 METHODS IN 
ENZYMOLOGY 335 (1987); Randall Saiki et al., Primer-Directed Enzymatic 
Amplification of DNA with a Thermostable DNA Polymerase, 239 SCI. 487 (1988); 
Al Edwards et al., DNA Typing and Genetic Mapping with Trimeric and Tetrameric 
Tandem Repeats, 49 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 746 (1991). For an excellent overview 
of DNA technologies in general, including the ones discussed herein, see DNA 
8
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into the courtroom.34 In 1987, a British man named Colin Pitchfork 
became the first person ever identified and charged with a crime as a 
result of DNA testing.35 Shortly thereafter, a Florida judge allowed the 
use of DNA evidence to convict Tommy Lee Andrews of aggravated 
battery, sexual battery, and burglary.36 Today, DNA evidence is 
routinely admitted, both because DNA has been conclusively 
established as a unique identifier, and because as science strains 
against the initial limits of the technology, more DNA evidence is 
available. Smaller sample sizes, different types of DNA recovery (such 
as mtDNA and Y-STR DNA),37 and larger databases in which to 
                                                                                                                   
Technologies, NATURE MILESTONES, Oct. 2007, at S1, available at 
http://www.nature.com/milestones/dnatechnologies. 
34 Tresa Baldas, First DNA Conviction Case Returns, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 9, 2004, 
at 5. 
35 Stephen Michaud, DNA Detectives, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 6, 1988, at 70. 
36 Id. (describing Andrews v. State, a Florida case “in which conviction hinged 
almost exclusively on DNA testing”). See Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841, 850 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding the lower court’s conviction and stating that 
“evidence from DNA print identification appears based on proven scientific 
principles.”). Prior to that date, DNA evidence had also been used in a civil context. 
See Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, Nos. 85-CR-1020-A-E and 85-CR-1019-A-D, 
aff’d, 617 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); NORAH RUDIN & KEITH INMAN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 191 (2d ed. 2002) (describing 
Pestinikas as the first use of DNA in a U.S. trial). 
37 Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is a particular type of DNA found in only in 
the mitochondria (a particular organelle within the cell) and inherited from one’s 
mother; an offspring inherits nuclear DNA, on the other hand, from both its mother 
and father. Mitochondrial DNA is useful in that it may be obtained from samples 
where nuclear DNA cannot be found (such as in cut hair, which does not have an 
attached follicle) and less DNA is needed for testing. On the other hand, mtDNA is 
more prone to contamination than nuclear DNA, and since every person sharing a 
maternal line will have identical mtDNA, it cannot serve as a unique individual 
identifier. See Alice R. Isenberg & Jodi M. Moore, Mitochondrial DNA Analysis at 
the FBI Laboratory, 1 FORENSIC SCI. COMMC’NS (1999), 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july1999/dnalist.htm. Likewise, Y-STR 
DNA analysis looks only to the Y-chromosome of a male suspect or offender and 
can be used to eliminate a suspect, but generally cannot be used to conclusively 
identify the perpetrator. See Isabelle Sibille et al., Y-STR DNA Amplification as 
9
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search for suspect matches all contribute to the ubiquity of DNA 
evidence. 
The federal government first began collecting and analyzing DNA 
samples from felons in 1990.38 In 1994, Congress passed the DNA 
Identification Act, which formally recognized the FBI’s ability to 
establish and maintain the CODIS national DNA database.39 CODIS is 
a three-tiered system: the DNA “profiles” (which are generated via 
chemical analysis of the DNA sample) originate at the local level, and 
are stored in the Local DNA Index System (LDIS); from there, the 
profiles flow to the state system (SDIS), where various state 
laboratories are able to share and compare profiles; and finally, the 
profiles are indexed in the national system (NDIS).40 Six different 
DNA profile categories are maintained: the convicted offender 
database, which contains the vast majority of the profiles; the forensic 
database, which contains profiles that are gathered from crime scenes 
and are believed to originate from the perpetrator; the arrestee 
database, which contains profiles from persons arrested for a 
qualifying offense under state law;41 the missing persons database; the 
biological relatives of missing persons database; and finally, the 
database for unidentified human remains.42 
CODIS has continued to grow, due in part to ever-expanding 
eligibility for inclusion in the system. In 2000, the DNA Analysis 
Backlog Elimination Act required federal parolees and probationers to 
                                                                                                                   
Biological Evidence in Sexually-Assaulted Female Victims With No Cytological 
Detection of Spermatozoa, 125 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 212 (2002). 
38 Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS—Mission Statement & 
Background, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/program.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 
2007). 
39 DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 201301, 108 Stat. 
1796, 2065. 
40 Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 38. 
41 See supra note 2. The FBI may have to change this definition shortly in light 
of the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, as this Act extends the reach of DNA collection 
to include federal arrestee profiles in CODIS. See DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1001, 119 Stat. 2960, 3084. 
42 Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 5. 
10
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provide DNA samples,43 and in 2001, the Patriot Act further expanded 
the list of persons required to give DNA.44 In 2004, Congress passed 
the Justice for All Act, which expanded CODIS to include those who 
had been charged with a crime or, in some circumstances, simply 
arrested.45 Most recently, in the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, the 
federal government has provided for the inclusion of samples from 
both federal arrestees and non-U.S. citizen detainees.46 
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that as of August 2007 the NDIS 
contained more than 4.9 million offender profiles and just over 
188,000 forensic profiles.47 Over 440,000 of the offender profiles 
come from the three states in the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction.48 And 
just as the list of qualifying federal offenses has continued to grow, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin are likely to see similar expansions to 
their statutes—all of these states are considering expanding or have 
expanded the states’ SDIS databases to include, for example, profiles 
from persons charged with a crime, convicted of a misdemeanor, or 
arrested.49 
                                                 
43 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 
Stat. 2726. 
44 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat. 272, 364 (2001). 
45 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260, 
2269. The law allowed CODIS to include profiles from those “charged in an 
indictment or information with a crime” and “other persons whose DNA samples are 
collected under applicable legal authorities,” provided that the arrestee samples were 
not be included in the NDIS. Id. at § 203(a)(1)(B)–(C). They could, presumably, be 
included in the SDIS or LDIS systems. 
46 DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1001, 119 Stat. 2960, 
3084. 
47 Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS—National DNA Index System, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2007). 
48 As of October 2007, the FBI listed 104,176 offender profiles from 
Wisconsin; 72,331 profiles from Indiana; and 271,438 profiles from Illinois. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, CODIS—Statistical Clickable Map, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2007). 
49 Wisconsin has proposed legislation that allows for the collection of DNA 
evidence if person is charged with a felony and a court determines that probable 
cause exists to believe that person committed the felony. Assem. B. 1, 98th Leg. 
11
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B. CODIS and the Fourth Amendment 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.50 
 
DNA collection statutes have been subjected to a host of 
constitutional challenges,51 but here I focus on just one—the Fourth 
Amendment challenge. Obviously, the Fourth Amendment only 
applies when a search or seizure has occurred. As Justice Harlan 
explained in Katz v. United States, a search occurs when an individual 
has a subjective expectation of privacy in the object being searched.52 
This subjective expectation alone does not suffice—society must also 
generally recognize that expectation of privacy as reasonable.53 If both 
of these criteria are met, then the search (in the colloquial sense) is a 
“search” (in the constitutional sense). As such, it must be supported by 
                                                                                                                   
Sess., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007). Illinois collects DNA samples from those convicted of 
certain sexually-motivated misdemeanors, 2005 Ill. Laws 1018, and is considering 
legislation that would allow for the collection of DNA evidence upon arrest. H.B. 
1901, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007); S.B. 1315, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007). Indiana is also considering legislation that would allow 
collection of a DNA sample upon arrest for certain felonies. H.B. 1730, 115th Gen. 
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2007). 
50 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
51 In United States v. Hook, for example, the defendant challenged the 
collection under the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Thirteenth Amendments, as well 
as under the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder clauses, the Equal Protection clause, 
and as a violation of separation of powers. 471 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 2006). 
52 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (applying Justice Harlan’s formulation of a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment). 
53 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
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probable cause unless the search falls under one of the exceptions to 
the probable-cause requirement.54 
Courts have firmly embraced the notion that the extraction of a 
person’s blood for DNA analysis is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.55 This result flows from Schmerber v. California, a case 
in which the Supreme Court held that testing blood samples for 
evidence of drunkenness plainly constitutes a “search[] of 
‘persons’ . . . within the meaning of that Amendment.”56 But it’s not 
that simple. Some courts have held that more than one search takes 
place in the context of CODIS: first, the physical drawing of blood; 
and second, the subsequent chemical analysis of that sample.57 Other 
                                                 
54 The definition of probable cause is ever elusive. The Supreme Court has 
consistently resisted providing a concrete standard for this idea—it is “a practical, 
nontechnical” and “fluid concept,” but the various definitions all have one thing in 
common: “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, [where] the belief of guilt must be 
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.” Maryland v. 
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (citations and quotations omitted). 
55 Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that taking a DNA 
sample is “clearly a search”); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (“There is no question that the compulsory extraction of blood for DNA 
profiling constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”) 
(citations omitted). 
56 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The collection of DNA using other methods, such 
as cheek swabs, also constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Analyses of 
blood, urine, cheek cell, and breath samples have all been held to constitute a search. 
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602, 614, 617 (1989) (“We are unwilling to conclude . . . that breath and 
urine tests . . . will not implicate the Fourth Amendment” and “[although] collecting 
and testing urine samples do[es] not entail a surgical intrusion into the body,” the 
“chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical 
facts about an employee . . . . Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the 
sample to be tested . . . itself implicates privacy interests.”); Banks v. United States, 
490 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A]nalyzing the DNA . . . from a cheek 
swab[] must pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”) (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616; 
Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
57 E.g., United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276 (D. Mass. 2007); 
Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1254 (N.D. Okla. 2006); State v. Transou, 
201 S.W.3d 607, 619 (Tenn. 2006) (citations omitted). Some defendants have 
13
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courts have held that “if the initial search is lawful, the subsequent use 
of the evidence seized is not a search that implicates the Fourth 
Amendment.”58 In at least one case, a court even held that the 
defendant did not have the requisite standing to challenge the use of 
his DNA profile.59 
This debate is not merely one of semantics—it could have 
important consequences for a person facing DNA collection. Although 
it is well settled that a blood draw is minimally invasive,60 some courts 
are increasingly willing to embrace the idea that the chemical analysis 
of that blood, at least in the DNA context, may create a significant 
privacy concern.61 The weight given to the privacy interest at stake is 
of paramount importance, since regardless of which test is used to 
determine whether a search is unreasonable under the Fourth 





                                                                                                                   
attempted to argue that the subsequent comparison of their DNA against other 
samples via CODIS is an additional search, though as yet this proposition finds no 
support in the case law. E.g., Johnson, 440 F.3d at 498-99 (noting that “the 
consequences of the contrary conclusion would be staggering”). The Johnson court 
considered two searches: the collection of a blood sample, and the comparison 
between that sample and others in CODIS. The court did not consider whether the 
chemical analysis was a separate search under the Fourth Amendment. 
58 E.g., A.A. v. Attorney General, 914 A.2d 260, 266-67 (N.J. 2007) (citing 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987)). 
59 Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ind. 2001). 
60 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771; Winston v. 
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983); 
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957)) (quotations omitted). 
61 Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 276; Banks, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1254; Transou, 
201 S.W.3d at 619. But see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 92-93 
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the only search that occurs in the taking 
and testing of a urine sample is taking of the sample, and analogizing the testing step 
as akin to the taking of abandoned property, such as garbage left at the curb). 
62 See infra Part II(A) for a complete description of the balancing tests. 
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II. A TALE OF TWO TESTS: REASONABLENESS AND SPECIAL NEEDS 
 
The Fourth Amendment does not prevent every search by the 
government—it only requires that the search be “reasonable.” Nor is 
“reasonable” some absolute standard. As the Supreme Court noted, 
what is reasonable will depend on the context of the search.63 
Generally, reasonable searches require probable cause, and probable 
cause is required to obtain a warrant.64 But “probable cause is not an 
irreducible requirement of a valid search” and “[w]here a careful 
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the 
public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of 
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, [the Supreme Court] 
has not hesitated to adopt such a standard.”65 
Despite that language, the Court continues to insist that it only has 
permitted a few “narrowly defined intrusions” upon a person’s privacy 
absent a showing of probable cause.66 Examples of such intrusions can 
be placed into two categories: those searches that require some 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, but do not require that 
suspicion to rise to the level of probable cause; and those searches that 
are completely suspicionless. The former category requires some 
amount of “reasonable” suspicion; the latter, at issue in DNA 
                                                 
63 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). 
64 The Fourth Amendment does not always require a warrant. See, e.g., 
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that 
police officers were not required to get a warrant prior to searching a residence when 
speed was “essential” to officers’ safety and the officers had probable cause to 
believe the suspect had a weapon and was inside the residence); see also Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Chambers v. Marony, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In 
general, however, those searches that can be executed without a warrant must be 
based upon probable cause. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66 
(1968)). 
65 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
66 Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214 (“For all but those narrowly defined intrusions, 
the requisite ‘balancing’ has been performed in centuries of precedent and is 
embodied in the principle that seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if supported by 
probable cause.”). 
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collection, is a “closely guarded category”67 that may require other 
forms of protection against abuse, such as “programmatic protections” 
that divest authorities of discretion in deciding how and when to 
administer the search.68 
All of the circuit courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment 
issues raised by state or federal DNA statutes and all have either 
implicitly or explicitly acknowledged that sample collection is a 
suspicionless search—one that occurs without any individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing.69 Although the circuit courts seem to agree 
on many things—notably, that DNA collection is a suspicionless 
search, and that this search is constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment, etc.—the courts vary in how they analyze this type of 
search. Some analyze the search under the general “reasonableness” 
approach, whereas others first determine whether the search meets a 
“special need” before going on to weigh the various interests involved. 
One might ask, “If the starting point and the endpoint are the 
same, what difference does it make how the courts arrive at their 
conclusions?” As we will see, it can and should have a significant 
impact. First, however, a brief description and explanation of the 
differences between these two frameworks is required. 
 
 
                                                 
67 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001) (citing Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997)); see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 
36-37 (2000) (“[W]e have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual 
rule [requiring individualized suspicion] does not apply.”). 
68 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81-82; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46 (2000) (citing 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). 
69 See generally United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 
1178 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 
674 (6th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 
(11th Cir. 2005); Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 
302 (4th Cir. 1992). 
16
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A. Analytical Frameworks 
 
Historically, the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for 
any search.70 Over time, however, the courts drifted to a more relaxed 
interpretation—one that, in certain “limited circumstances,”71 permits 
a search unsupported by any individualized suspicion. In this context, 
courts have adopted at least two distinct analytical frameworks.72 
The first is the reasonableness standard.73 The reasonableness 
standard “requires balancing the need to search against the invasion 
which the search entails. On one side of the balance are arrayed the 
individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; 
on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with 
breaches of public order.”74 In other words, “the reasonableness of a 
search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to 
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 
                                                 
70 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1386 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 
2002) (“[B]y the end of the 1920s . . . . [p]robable cause was required for all searches 
or arrests. A warrant, obtained in advance, was required at least for searches of 
homes, and possibly for many other searches as well.”). 
71 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 36-37. 
72 The jurisprudence in this area is somewhat confusing, as the Supreme Court 
has never set down a clear division between the various categories of searches which 
can be supported by something less than probable cause. See id. (describing 
permissible suspicionless searches in the context of special needs, administrative 
searches, border patrols, and sobriety checkpoints); Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822-24 
(describing three non-mutually exclusive categories of suspicionless searches as the 
“exempted areas,” such as borders and airports; “administrative searches” in the 
context of closely-regulated businesses; and “special needs”); Edwin J. Butterfoss, A 
Suspicionless Search and Seizure Quagmire: The Supreme Court Revives the Pretext 
Doctrine and Creates Another Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 419, 421 (2007) (noting that the Court has never identified a discrete category 
of permissible suspicionless searches, and has justified suspicionless searches at 
different times as falling under an administrative, special needs, checkpoint or 
inventory, or “general Fourth Amendment” approach). 
73 E.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (citing Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)) (equating the two standards). 
74 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (citing Camara v. Mun. 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)) (quotations omitted). 
17
Fender: Probationers, Parolees and DNA Collection: Is This "Justice for A
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 329
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.”75 Under this standard, “both the inception and 
the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable;”76 the latter requires that 
the search as conducted must be “reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”77 
The second is the “special needs” standard. In those instances 
where the government can identify a special need “beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement”—a need that makes obtaining a warrant or 
requiring probable cause impracticable—it may be able to forego the 
warrant and probable cause requirements.78 First, a court must 
consider whether the search satisfies a special need.79 If so, the court 
goes on to balance the nature of the privacy interest compromised by 
the search and the “character of the intrusion” imposed by the search 
against the “nature and immediacy of the government’s concerns and 
the efficacy of the [search] in meeting them.”80 
In addition to disagreeing over which test is applicable for DNA 
collection statutes, the courts have also disagreed over which test is the 
most rigorous of the two.81 The Third Circuit has held that the 
reasonableness test is the most stringent, and it adopted that test when 
it analyzed a supervised releasee’s82 Fourth Amendment challenge to 
                                                 
75 Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 
300 (1999)) (quotations omitted). 
76 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987). 
77 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
78 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
79 For a discussion of what suffices as a “special need,” see discussion infra 
Part II(B). 
80 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830-38 (2002) (citing Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)). 
81 United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 9 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007). 
82 In the federal system, parole was replaced with “supervised release” by the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING 
THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 1-11 (2004), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf. 
18
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DNA collection.83 The court applied the “more rigorous” 
reasonableness test because the purpose for collecting DNA went 
“well beyond the supervision by the Probation Office of an individual 
on supervised release.”84 The Eighth Circuit also adopted this 
reasoning when it chose to apply the reasonableness test to DNA 
collection.85 
In United States v. Amerson, however, the Second Circuit 
persuasively argued that the special needs test was the more stringent 
of the two. In doing so, the court clarified how it is that courts can 
apply different tests, yet consistently reach the same result: 
 
The special needs exception requires the court to 
ask two questions. First, is the search justified by a 
special need beyond the ordinary need for normal 
law enforcement? Second, if the search does serve a 
special need, is the search reasonable when the 
government's special need is weighed against the 
intrusion on the individual's privacy interest? A 
general balancing test, on the other hand, only 
requires the court to balance the government's 
interest in conducting the search against the 
individual's privacy interests.86 
 
                                                 
83 United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e believe 
that it is appropriate to examine the reasonableness of the taking of the sample under 
the more rigorous Knights totality of the circumstances test rather than the Griffin 
special needs exception.”). 
84 Id. Precisely how this statement justifies the choice of one framework over 
another is unclear—if anything, the statement seems to set up the court to adopt the 
special needs approach, since the choice rests upon the fact that there are larger 
(presumably non-law enforcement) purposes served by DNA collection. 
85 United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006). 
86 United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 n.6 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing 
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 664 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005)) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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The court went on to explain that, once one concludes that the 
government has a special need to obtain DNA samples, the second 
prong of the special needs test becomes “very similar” to the balancing 
required under a reasonableness framework. In fact, the court stated 
that “had we concluded that it was appropriate to apply a general 
balancing test to suspicionless searches of probationers—which we did 
not—we would have reached the same result that we do under the 
special needs test.”87 
The Second Circuit’s reasoning makes perfect sense. The 
balancing tests under both the reasonableness and the special needs 
standards are indeed very similar. In fact, despite the ostensible 
language differences (weighing the government’s “legitimate 
interests” in the reasonableness context versus weighing the 
government’s “special needs”) most courts do not make this 
distinction—they engage in the same balancing test regardless of the 
framework they choose.88 Because the balancing prong of the tests are 
de facto identical, and because the special needs test requires an 
additional step before the court may engage in balancing the interests 
involved, the special needs test must be the more stringent of the two. 
Most federal circuit courts have chosen to analyze federal and 
state DNA statutes under the reasonableness standard. A minority, 
including the Seventh Circuit, have chosen to analyze the statutes 
under the special needs approach.89 In the next section, I explore the 
                                                 
87 Amerson, 483 F.3d at 79 n.6. 
88 E.g., Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1059 (7th Cir. 
2000) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995)) (listing 
the factors for special needs analysis as “(1) the nature of the privacy interest upon 
which the search intrudes, (2) the character of the intrusion on the individual’s 
privacy interest, (3) the nature of the governmental concern at issue, (4) the 
immediacy of the government’s concern, and (5) the efficacy of the particular means 
in addressing the problem.”). 
89 United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits use the totality of the 
circumstances analysis; the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits apply the special 
needs analysis; and the Sixth Circuit has declined to choose a mode of analysis, 
holding that the DNA Act is constitutional under both the totality of the 
circumstances and the special needs test). 
20
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evolution of these two exceptions to the warrant and probable cause 
requirement and why it is the reasonableness approach, not the special 
needs test, that applies to DNA collection statutes. 
 
B. The Supreme Court’s Suspicionless Search Jurisprudence 
 
The evolution of the special needs test can be traced back at least 
as far as New Jersey v. T.L.O.90 T.L.O. has the distinction of being the 
first case in which the Court used the term “special needs.” There, a 
schoolteacher found a young girl smoking in the bathroom; when 
taken to the principal’s office, the girl denied it.91 An administrator 
then demanded the girl’s purse, opened it, and found a pack of 
cigarettes and some rolling papers.92 The administrator recognized the 
papers as typical of those used to smoke marijuana, and continued 
searching the purse until he located the drug. After the student was 
suspended, she challenged both the initial search of her purse and the 
search for marijuana under the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                 
90 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Some persuasively argue that its true origin lies within 
Camara v. Municipal Courts. Butterfoss, supra note 72, at 420. In Camara, the 
Court examined the warrantless search of a rental unit by a housing inspector. 387 
U.S. 523, 525-26 (1967). Despite noting that a routine inspection of private property 
was not as invasive as when the police search “for the fruits and instrumentalities of 
crime;” the Court nevertheless held that a significant intrusion had occurred. Id. at 
534. The inspector was therefore required to obtain a warrant prior to carrying out 
the administrative search. That alone, however, did not settle the question. The Court 
went on to determine “whether some other accommodation between public need and 
individual right [was] essential.” Id. Instead of using the typical formulation of 
probable cause—namely, one dependent upon individualized suspicion—the Court 
defined probable cause in unique terms, holding that “‘probable cause’ to issue a 
warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for 
conducting an area inspection are satisfied.” Id. at 538. Camara, therefore, has the 
(perhaps ignoble) distinction of being the first case in which the Supreme Court 
authorized a search absent any individualized suspicion. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) (describing Camara as holding that “the appropriate 
standard for administrative searches is not probable cause in its traditional 
meaning”). 
91 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328-29. 
92 Id. 
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Although the term “special needs” is often attributed solely to 
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, the majority recognized that “the 
special needs of the school environment require assessment of the 
legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than that of 
probable cause.”93 Instead of requiring probable cause, the Court held 
that the legality of the searches at issue depended on “the 
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search[es].”94 To 
determine whether the searches were reasonable, the Court engaged in 
the now-canonical balancing test, weighing the student’s legitimate 
expectation of privacy and security against the government’s interest 
in dealing with breaches of the public order.95 The Court concluded 
that both searches were reasonable and constitutional.96 
The Court explicitly limited its holding: even though the searches 
at issue were based on individualized suspicion, the Court refused to 
decide whether individualized suspicion was “an essential element of 
the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school 
authorities.”97 Although constitutional searches usually call for some 
individualized suspicion, such suspicion is not always necessary.98 The 
Court warned that those exceptions are few and far between, as they 
are “generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated 
by a search are minimal and where other safeguards are available to 
assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not 
subject to the discretion of the official in the field.”99 
                                                 
93 Id. at 333. Although the quoted language actually refers to the Court’s 
restatement of the Supreme Court of New Jersey and other courts’ opinions, the 
Court ultimately adopted the same reasoning, holding that “the school setting 
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are 
ordinarily subject.” Id. at 340. Ultimately, the Court required neither a warrant nor 
probable cause. Id. at 340-42. 
94 Id. at 341. 
95 Id. at 337. 
96 Id. at 346-47 & n.12. 
97 Id. at 342 n.8. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)) (emphasis 
added and quotation marks omitted). 
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The opinion proffers five different approaches to the same issue. 
It is Justice Blackmun’s lonely concurrence, however, that continues to 
inform suspicionless search jurisprudence today. Justice Blackmun 
largely agreed with the majority’s opinion, but he wrote separately to 
express concern over what he saw as a divergence from the Court’s 
past practices.100 He saw those decisions as illustrating that the 
Framers had already engaged in the requisite balancing, and had 
determined that “reasonableness” was synonymous with the warrant 
and probable cause requirements.101 In Justice Blackmun’s view, 
“Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to 
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”102 He 
defined that special need as the “need for greater flexibility,”103 when, 
“as a practical matter,” it would be impossible to obtain a warrant or to 
satisfy the probable-cause requirement. Because in T.L.O. teachers, 
and not police, were conducting the searches; and because there was a 
special need for an immediate response to anything threatening school 
safety or learning, Justice Blackmun believed that the searches at issue 
were constitutional.104 Two years later, Justice Blackmun’s special 
needs framework was formally adopted in O’Connor v. Ortega.105  
                                                 
100 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
101 Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)). See Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979) (“For all but those narrowly defined intrusions, 
the requisite ‘balancing’ has been performed in centuries of precedent and is 
embodied in the principle that seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if supported by 
probable cause.”). 
102 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
103 Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting)). 
104 Id. at 353. 
105 480 U.S. 709, 720, 724-25 (1987). In that case, a public employer searched 
an employee’s office upon an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing—the 
employee had allegedly improperly solicited contributions from and sexually 
harassed other employees. Id. at 712-14. Although the employee had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his office, the Court did not require a warrant or probable 
cause prior to the search. Id. at 721, 724. Instead, the Court expressly drew on 
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The next key case for our purposes, Griffin v. Wisconsin, is of 
particular relevance because it addressed the warrantless search of a 
probationer.106 As a felon on probation, Griffin was not permitted to 
possess a firearm.107 During his probation, a policeman informed 
Griffin’s probation office that Griffin “had or might have” guns in his 
apartment.108 Probation officers and the police searched Griffin’s 
home, where they found an illegal handgun.109 Griffin challenged the 
search; the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction because 
under Wisconsin law, the probation officer did not have to obtain a 
warrant. Instead, the probation officer only was required to obtain 
supervisor approval and to have “reasonable grounds” to believe that 
the probationer possessed a forbidden item prior to searching the 
probationer’s home.110 
As in T.L.O. and Ortega, the party conducting the search had an 
individualized, reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, and as in Ortega, 
the Supreme Court applied the special needs test to analyze the 
constitutionality of the search.111 The Court analogized a state’s 
operation of a probation system to that of a school or prison, and 
reasoned that the state had a special need—supervision of 
probationers—that made the warrant and probable-cause requirements 
impracticable.112 The Court recognized that a probationer could never 
enjoy the same absolute liberty to which a law-abiding citizen is 
                                                                                                                   
Justice Blackmun’s reasoning in T.L.O. to support its holding that the warrant and 
probable cause requirements were “impracticable” for “legitimate work-related, 
noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct.” 
Id. at 725. And as in T.L.O., the Court again refused to comment on whether 
individualized suspicion was an essential element of the standard of reasonableness. 
Id. at 726. 
106 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
107 Id. at 871-72. 
108 Id. at 880. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 870-72. 
111 Id. at 873. The Court did so without any discussion as to why it chose to 
apply the special needs test instead of the totality of the circumstances test. 
112 Id. at 873-75.  
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entitled, but also took care to note that the probationer did not lose all 
protection against invasions of his privacy.113 After determining that 
the search did not require a warrant or probable cause,114 the Court 
went on to determine whether that search was reasonable. The Court 
agreed that the search satisfied Wisconsin’s “reasonable grounds” 
standard and that the search was constitutional because “it was 
conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers.”115 
The Griffin decision seemed to signal that the special needs 
framework applied to probationer searches, at least when the searcher 
had an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. But Griffin, T.L.O., 
and Ortega all dealt with searches as a result of individualized 
suspicion; other cases addressed the issue as to whether the special 
needs test could apply to suspicionless searches. In using the special 
needs test to evaluate suspicionless searches, however, the Court 
opened up a new line of inquiry: just what, precisely, is required to 
show that a “need beyond the normal need for law enforcement” 
exists? 
                                                 
113 See id. at 874. 
114 Id. at 876 (“A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree 
with the probation system, setting up a magistrate rather than the probation officer as 
the judge of how close a supervision the probationer requires. Moreover, the delay 
inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to 
respond quickly to evidence of misconduct . . . and would reduce the deterrent effect 
that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create . . . .”). In 
analyzing the probable-cause requirement, the Court relied upon a textual 
interpretation of the Constitution, noting that although probable cause might be 
required in circumstances where a warrant was not, the reverse was not true, since 
“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” Therefore, when a judicially-
issued warrant is required, “[the search] is also of such a nature as to require 
probable cause.” Id. at 877-78. Even absent this reading, the Court would have 
required a lesser degree of suspicion since the “probation regime would also be 
unduly disrupted by a requirement of probable cause.” Id. at 878. 
115 Id. at 880. Earlier in the opinion, the Court referenced Camara, stating that 
it had permitted searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme without a warrant or 
probable cause when the search met “reasonable legislative or administrative 
standards.” Id. at 873. It is not clear whether the Court was stating that the search at 
issue in Griffin was such a regulatory search. See id. at 878 n.4. 
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In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, for example, the Court used the 
special needs test to evaluate a suspicionless drug-testing program.116 
In response to an apparent increase in “crack babies,” a public hospital 
instituted a program whereby it identified nine possible signs117 that a 
pregnant woman was using cocaine; upon satisfying at least one of the 
criteria, the hospital would collect the mother’s urine for drug testing 
without her consent or knowledge.118 Women thus identified as 
cocaine abusers were threatened with “law enforcement involvement” 
if they did not agree to take part in certain educational activities or to 
join a substance abuse program.119 
The Court found that there was no reasonable suspicion 
whatsoever that the women identified in this manner abused illegal 
drugs.120 The Court analyzed the suspicionless search using the special 
needs approach, bringing Ferguson in line with four previous cases in 
which it had evaluated drug-testing programs.121 In each of those 
                                                 
116 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
117 These criteria included (1) lack of any prenatal care, (2) late prenatal care 
(that is, prenatal care after twenty-four weeks of gestation), (3) “incomplete” 
prenatal care, (4) abruption placentae, (5) intrauterine fetal death, (6) preterm labor 
“of no obvious cause,” (7) intrauterine growth retardation “of no obvious cause,” (8) 
previously known drug or alcohol abuse, and (9) any unexplained congenital 
anomalies. Id. at 71 n.4. 
118 Id. at 70-72. The consent issue was not addressed by the Court; instead, it 
assumed without deciding that the searches were conducted without informed 
consent and decided the case on special needs grounds. It then remanded the case for 
a determination of the consent issue. Id. at 76, 77 & n.11. 
119 Id. at 72. 
120 Id. at 76-77. The Court did not undertake its own substantive analysis of 
this issue, but it did note that the hospital did not point to any evidence that any of 
the nine factors “was more apt to be caused by cocaine use than by some other 
factor, such as malnutrition, illness, or indigency. More significantly . . . the 
reasoning of the majority panel opinion rest on the premise that the policy would be 
valid even if the tests were conducted randomly.” Id. at 77 n.10. 
121 Id. at 77. These included Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); and Chandler v. Miller, 520 
U.S. 305 (1997). The Ferguson Court noted that in the first three of these cases, it 
upheld drug tests, whereas in Chandler, the Court struck down the testing as 
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cases, government officials argued that the search met a special need 
“divorced from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.”122 
Here, in contrast, the Court believed that the “central and 
indispensable feature” of the program was the use of law enforcement 
to pressure women into treatment programs.123 The Court 
distinguished the three earlier cases in which it had upheld drug-
testing programs, reasoning that it had permitted those warrantless, 
suspicionless searches in part “because there was no law enforcement 
purpose behind the searches . . . and there was little, if any, 
entanglement with law enforcement.”124 
In fact, the State had argued that the ultimate purpose of the 
program was not law enforcement, but to protect the health of the 
mother and fetus.125 The Court, however, refused to accept the State’s 
characterization of the program’s purpose; instead, it engaged in a 
“close review” to make its own determination.126 The Court built upon 
the programmatic purpose reasoning it first described in City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond,127 refining the inquiry into one of the 
                                                                                                                   
unconstitutional. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77. In each of these cases, the Court used a 
special needs framework to evaluate the constitutionality of the search at issue. 
122 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79. 
123 Id. at 80. 
124 Id. at 81. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. (citing Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322). 
127 531 U.S. 32 (2000). Edmond is not technically a special needs case, since 
the Edmond Court discussed its checkpoint cases as being in a category apart from 
special needs. Id. at 37-38. In Edmond, the plaintiffs were stopped at a suspicionless 
narcotics checkpoint; an officer examined the driver and the car using a narcotics-
detection dog. Id. at 35-36. The Court had previously upheld some suspicionless 
checkpoint searches, but it distinguished the facts in Edmond by focusing on the 
“primary purpose” of the seizure—in Edmond, the program “unquestionably ha[d] 
the primary purpose of interdicting illegal narcotics,” and the Court emphasized that 
it had never approved a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of detecting 
“evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Id. at 40-41. Moreover, in permitting 
inquiry into the programmatic purposes of a search, the Court included the special 
needs framework, stating that its “special needs and administrative search cases 
demonstrate that purpose is often relevant when suspicionless intrusions pursuant to 
a general scheme are at issue.” Id. at 47. 
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program’s relevant primary purpose.128 Even though the ultimate point 
of the program was to obtain substance abuse help for expectant 
mothers, the immediate objective129 was to generate evidence for law 
enforcement, since the “policy was specifically designed to gather 
evidence of violations of penal laws.”130 The search could not, 
therefore, satisfy a special need beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.131 
After Ferguson, the Court seemed to be consistently applying the 
special needs test to evaluate searches unsupported by warrants or 
probable cause. But in United States v. Knights, the Court revisited the 
applicability of the special needs framework when it examined the 
warrantless search of a probationer.132 Knights had been sentenced to 
probation for a drug offense, and as a condition of that probation he 
signed an order that permitted the search of his person or residence 
without a warrant or “reasonable cause.”133 Lo and behold, Knights’ 
apartment was searched—but not without reasonable cause.134 Knights 
had a previous run-in with an electric company, and when the 
company suffered $1.5 million in damage from an act of vandalism, 
Knights became a suspect.135 A detective decided to search Knights’ 
apartment without a warrant, and upon doing so discovered evidence 
                                                 
128 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81. The Court distinguished this “primary purpose” 
from an “ultimate” purpose or goal—and even where the ultimate purpose was not 
related to law enforcement, if the primary purpose was for law enforcement 
purposes, the search required a warrant and individualized suspicion. Id. at 82-84. To 
allow otherwise, apparently, would be to constitutionalize almost any suspicionless 
search, since the search could be justified by its ultimate purpose. Id. at 84. 
129 The Court used the terms “immediate objective” and “primary purpose” 
interchangeably. 
130 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84. 
131 Id. at 86. 
132 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
133 Id. at 114. 
134 Id. at 115. 
135 Id. at 114. 
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of the crime.136 The district court granted a motion to suppress this 
evidence, and the government appealed.137 
Knights relied on the Griffin holding, arguing that the search had 
to be analyzed under the special needs framework.138 The Court 
disagreed, stating that “[t]his dubious logic . . . runs contrary to 
Griffin’s express statement that its ‘special needs’ holding made it 
‘unnecessary to consider whether’ warrantless searches of probationers 
were otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”139 But the Court did not explain why the special needs 
framework was inappropriate; instead, the Court simply used the 
reasonableness test.140 The Court balanced Knights’ privacy interest 
against the government’s interests, and began with the observation that 
Knights’ probationer status informed “both sides of that balance.”141 
Because Knights was a probationer, the Court held that he had a 
significantly diminished expectation of privacy; when weighed against 
the government’s interest in rehabilitating Knights and in “protecting 
society against future criminal violations,” the government’s interests 
handily surpassed Knights’.142 The Court limited this holding by 
refusing to address the constitutionality of a suspicionless search under 
these circumstances—namely, when a probationer consents to 
suspicionless searches as part of his probation agreement.143 
What, then, are the lessons an appellate court would draw from 
looking at the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence up 
to and including Knights? Although the special needs framework first 
came into being in cases where the searching party reasonably 
                                                 
136 Id. at 115 & n.1. 
137 Id. at 116. 
138 Id. at 117. 
139 Id. at 117-18. 
140 Id. at 118. 
141 Id. at 119. 
142 Id. at 118-20. 
143 Id. at 120 n.6 (“[W]e need not address the constitutionality of a 
suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported by reasonable 
suspicion.”). 
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suspected an individual of some wrongdoing, over time the framework 
evolved to address suspicionless searches like those in Ferguson. 
Griffin seemed to indicate that the special needs framework applied to 
probationer searches supported by individualized suspicion, but 
Knights indicates that under similar facts, the Court endorsed the 
reasonableness test for use in determining whether a search is 
constitutional. 
In not overruling Griffin, however, the Knights Court left open the 
possibility that the special needs framework could still be appropriate 
when one is analyzing a probationer search supported by 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, but the Court did not explain 
how a lower court would decide which framework to use. Nor did 
Knights speak to suspicionless searches—although the Court 
apparently thought that it left the issue unresolved, Ferguson indicates 
that perhaps the question had already been answered; those cases 
might lead an appellate court to reason that suspicionless searches are 
governed by the special needs test. 
Ferguson and Edmond also specifically call for an inquiry into the 
programmatic purpose (or the primary purpose, or the immediate 
objective) of suspicionless searches, and ask an appellate court to 
engage in a “close review” of any proffered rationales for an 
administrative scheme that endorses such searches. Finally, none of 
these cases truly clarified what, precisely, was meant by the 
requirement that one have a need “beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.”144 
It is not surprising, then, that when analyzing a suspicionless 
search the Seventh Circuit would understand these cases to endorse a 
special needs approach—and this is, in fact, precisely what one sees in 
the Seventh Circuit’s suspicionless search case law. 
                                                 
144 Butterfoss, supra note 72, at 422-23 (citing various Supreme Court cases 
for the proposition that the Court has, at various times, “expressed concern over, or 
suggested a different outcome for, searches motivated by,” for example, a law 
enforcement purpose, general crime control purposes, an intent to aid law 
enforcement efforts, a purely investigatory purpose, an investigatory police motive, a 
search to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, or a search to obtain 
evidence of violations of the penal law). 
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III. SEVENTH CIRCUIT IMPROPERLY APPLIES SPECIAL NEEDS TO 
FEDERAL DNA COLLECTION 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Special Needs Cases 
 
The Seventh Circuit recognized the special needs test at least as 
early as 1996, in its Thompson v. Harper case.145 Since then, the court 
has proven quite capable of applying the special needs factors—
making the court’s failure to properly balance those factors in its DNA 
cases is all the more surprising.  
In Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp., for example, the 
Seventh Circuit engaged in a careful balancing of the relevant 
factors.146 As in T.L.O., certain high school students were subjected to 
random, suspicionless drug (including alcohol and nicotine) testing.147 
The Seventh Circuit wasted little time explaining why the special 
needs framework was appropriate; instead, after citing various other 
drug testing cases where the special needs test was used,148 and noting 
                                                 
145 77 F.3d 484 (1996) (unpublished table opinion). There, the court referenced 
Griffin for its understanding that the probation system poses special needs that could 
justify warrantless searches unsupported by probable cause, but the court did not 
actually engage in special needs balancing. The court took a more detailed look at 
the doctrine in United States v. Jones, when it rejected a parolee’s argument that the 
only special need capable of justifying a warrantless search unsupported by probable 
cause was the “need to act quickly to prevent harm to the probationer and society.” 
152 F.3d 680, 686 (1998). The Jones court also noted that it would review de novo a 
district court’s determination of whether “reasonable grounds” existed to support 
such a search. Id. at 687. 
146 212 F.3d 1052 (2000). 
147 Id. at 1054-55. The group of students that could be tested included those 
involved in non-athletic extracurricular activities and those that drove to school. 
148 Id. at 1058 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 
(1989) (using special needs analysis for suspicionless drug testing of railroad 
employees); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (same for drug testing of 
public office candidates); Vernonia Sch. Dist 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) 
(same for suspicionless drug testing of public school students); Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (same for suspicionless drug 
testing for U.S. Custom Service employees); Willis v. Anderson Community Sch. 
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that special needs in particular seem to arise in the public school 
context, it dove into its analysis.149 The court laid forth a series of 
factors that it used to balance between the government’s interests and 
those of the individual, including: “(1) the nature of the privacy 
interest upon which the search intrudes, (2) the character of the 
intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest, (3) the nature of the 
governmental concern at issue,150 (4) the immediacy of the 
government’s concern,151 and (5) the efficacy of the particular means 
in addressing the problem.”152 
In addition to the complicated balancing of these various factors, 
the court also had to contend with some of its own unwelcome 
precedent. The court previously addressed suspicionless drug testing 
in Todd v. Rush County Schools153 and Willis v. Anderson Community 
School Corp.154 The Joy panel stated that were it relying solely upon 
Supreme Court precedent, it would hold the random drug testing of 
students participating in extracurricular activities unconstitutional.155 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, however, the court felt compelled 
                                                                                                                   
Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998) (same for drug testing of a public school student 
accused of fighting)). 
149 Id. at 1058. The court’s language indicates that it may not have realized it 
had a choice, as it stated that to “be a reasonable search without a warrant and 
probable cause, the government must show a ‘special need,’ beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
150 The court analyzed this factor from two perspectives: first, whether there is 
a correlation between the defined population and drug abuse; and second, whether 
there is a correlation between the abuse and the government’s interest in protecting 
property and life. Id. at 1064. 
151 In Willis v. Anderson Community School Corp., the Seventh Circuit placed 
particular emphasis on this factor, stating that “it may be that when a suspicion-
based search is workable, the needs of the government will never be strong enough 
to outweigh the privacy interests of the individual.” 158 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 
1998) (emphasis added). 
152 Joy, 212 F.3d at 1059 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654, 658, 661, 662, 
663) (internal citations omitted). 
153 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998). 
154 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998). 
155 Joy, 212 F.3d at 1062-63. 
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to affirm the lower court’s decision on the basis of Todd—an opinion 
that did not even reference relevant Supreme Court precedent. 
Therefore, the court warned against an overly broad reading of its 
holding and strictly limited its conclusions to the facts of Joy,156 
stating that “[u]ntil we receive further guidance from the Supreme 
Court, we shall stand by our admonishment in Willis that the special 
needs exception must be justified” according to the factors described 
above.157 
Whether the court meant to further limit its holding as relevant 
only to suspicionless drug testing cases is not clear. It is clear that in 
its next special needs case, the Seventh Circuit did not reference the 
factors it highlighted so carefully in Joy. That case was Green v. 
Berge, the first Seventh Circuit decision to address DNA collection. 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s DNA Cases 
 
1. Green v. Berge 
 
In Green v. Berge, the Seventh Circuit evaluated the 
constitutionality of a Wisconsin law that had been amended to require 
all convicted felons to provide DNA samples.158 Four prisoners in 
Wisconsin’s Supermax penitentiary filed a suit challenging their DNA 
collection.159 From the moment one begins reading, it is clear that the 
opinion does not bode well for the plaintiffs. The court began by 
mentioning that almost all challenges to state- and federally-mandated 
DNA collections had failed, and as such, “the plaintiffs in this suit face 
a decidedly uphill struggle . . . .”160 
                                                 
156 Id. at 1066. 
157 Id. at 1067. 
158 354 F.3d 675 (2004). The Wisconsin law at issue was WIS. STAT. § 165.76 
(1993) (amended 1999). 
159 Green, 354 F.3d at 676. 
160 Id. at 676-77 (“[The] state and federal courts that have [addressed the issue] 
are almost unanimous in holding that these statutes do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
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The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that taking a person’s DNA is 
a search161 and that there was no individualized reasonable suspicion 
to believe these prisoners had committed a new crime.162 Without 
addressing the facts specific to this case, the court proffered other 
courts’ justifications for upholding these statutes: 
 
Courts uphold these DNA collection statutes 
because the government interest in obtaining 
reliable DNA identification evidence for storage in 
a database and possible use in solving past and 
future crimes outweighs the limited privacy 
interests that prisoners retain. Also, courts generally 
conclude that the collection of biological samples is 
only a minimal intrusion on one’s personal physical 
integrity. These courts find that the government has 
a special need in obtaining identity DNA 
samples.163 
 
The court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that a desire to build a 
DNA database went beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement.164 
It then explicitly adopted the reasoning of Chief Judge Crabb in the 
Western District of Wisconsin, who held that “[a]lthough the state’s 
DNA testing of inmates is ultimately for a law enforcement goal,” 
DNA collection seemed “to fit within the special needs 
analysis . . . since it is not undertaken for the investigation of a specific 
crime.”165 
                                                 
161 Id. at 676-77 (“Although the taking of a DNA sample is clearly a search, 
the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches, only those that are 
unreasonable.”). 
162 Id. at 676. 
163 Id. at 677. 
164 Id. (citing United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003)). 
165 Id. at 678 (citing Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-51 (W.D. 
Wis. 1996)). The court strongly agreed, calling the special needs framework “firmly 
entrenched” later in the opinion. Id. at 679. 
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The plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Edmond and Ferguson dictated a contrary result.166 Those opinions 
required inquiry into a suspicionless search program’s primary purpose 
or immediate objective. Since the plaintiffs believed that the primary 
purpose of DNA collection was to assist law enforcement, it followed 
that the search could not meet a special need. 
The Seventh Circuit did not find Edmond or Ferguson applicable. 
It first distinguished Edmond, finding that the primary purpose of the 
Edmond search had been to see if “then and there” a driver was using 
illegal drugs. In contrast, the court held that Wisconsin’s DNA statute 
did not have the purpose of searching for evidence of criminal 
behavior; instead, its purpose was to “obtain reliable proof of a felon’s 
identity.”167 The court also distinguished Ferguson. It interpreted 
Ferguson to show that the Supreme Court classified suspicionless drug 
testing cases as constitutional if (1) the person providing a sample 
understood the purpose of the test, and (2) the results of the test were 
protected from dissemination to third parties.168 Because the Green 
plaintiffs did not misunderstand the purpose of the DNA test, and 
because the Wisconsin statute prohibited unauthorized dissemination 
of the results, Ferguson was of little assistance. The court concluded 
that Wisconsin’s DNA statute was constitutional. 
Judge Easterbrook concurred. Although he joined the opinion 
without reservation, he wrote separately to express concern over the 
“lump[ing] together” of all persons potentially subjected to DNA 
collection.169 In his view, at least four distinct categories of persons 
exist for Fourth Amendment purposes: prisoners, people on 
conditional release, felons with expired terms, and those never 
convicted of a felony.170 Belying his own classification scheme, 
however, Judge Easterbrook did not take issue with DNA collection 
from within the first three categories; instead, he argued that only 
                                                 
166 Id. at 678. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 678-79. 
169 Id. at 679 (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
170 Id. at 680. 
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DNA collection from those in the fourth category might require a 
special need or individualized suspicion.171 He criticized a Ninth 
Circuit opinion that had applied the special needs framework to the 
DNA collection of a person on supervised release, claiming that the 
court “confuse[d] the fourth category with the second.”172 The judge 
concluded by noting that the fourth category was not at issue in Green, 
and that he read the court’s opinion to mean that a suspicionless DNA 
search was only permissible when conducted on those persons outside 
of his fourth category.173 
The Green opinion left many issues unresolved. Notably, the court 
did not address whether other searches occur in the context of DNA 
testing, such as, for example, the chemical analysis of a DNA 
sample.174 Nor did the court identify why the special needs framework, 
as opposed to the reasonableness framework, was the appropriate 
choice in this case of first impression. The Seventh Circuit also failed 
to evaluate those factors crucial in determining whether a special need 
exists, despite having identified the factors both in Joy175 and in its 
adoption of Chief Judge Crabb’s factor list in Green.176 The court 
simply accepted the outcome of other courts’ balancing. Finally, 
although Judge Easterbrook raised the subject, the majority opinion 
failed to address what effect, if any, the “continuum of possible 
punishments ranging from solitary confinement . . . to a few hours of 
mandatory community service”177 would have on its special needs 
analysis, since expectations of privacy vary as a convict’s status 
                                                 
171 Id. at 680-81. 
172 Id. at 681. Judge Easterbrook’s reasoning is less than clear, since his own 
Green panel applied special needs analysis to imprisoned felons (thereby apparently 
confusing the fourth category with the first). 
173 Id. 
174 See cases cited supra notes 55-62 & 254-57 and accompanying text. 
175 See discussion supra Part III(A). 
176 Green, 354 F.3d at 678 (citing Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 
1050-51 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (listing the factors the Supreme Court used to determine 
the reasonableness of various searches)). 
177 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
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changes. But despite these issues, the next Seventh Circuit case to 
address DNA collection adopted the Green reasoning wholesale. 
 
2. U.S. v. Hook 
 
In United States v. Hook, the Seventh Circuit revisited the issue of 
DNA collection.178 George Hook was a white collar criminal, 
convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and theft from an 
employee benefit plan.179 After serving his full prison term, he began 
serving his thirty-six month period of supervised release.180 As one of 
the terms of his release, Hook agreed to “follow the instructions of the 
probation officer.”181 That agreement was put to the test when, after 
about a year into his supervised release, Hook’s probation officer 
requested that Hook submit a DNA sample under the recently enacted 
Justice for All Act of 2004.182 Hook refused, and filed a petition in the 
Northern District of Illinois challenging the collection.183 
At the district court, Judge Lefkow recognized that courts have 
used two different approaches in analyzing DNA collection statutes.184 
The judge felt that there was no “constitutionally relevant distinction” 
between the Wisconsin law analyzed in Green and the facts in Hook’s 
case.185 Therefore, relying on Green, she used the special needs 
approach to determine whether Hook’s DNA collection was 
reasonable.186 Guided by the Supreme Court’s Edmond holding, she 
looked to the primary purpose of the federal DNA collection statute, 
and found that the “ultimate goal” was solving past and future crimes, 
                                                 
178 471 F.3d 766 (2006). 
179 Id. at 769. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 770. 
182 Id. at 769. 
183 United States v. Hook, No. 04-CR-1045, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2386, at 
*1-13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2006). 
184 Id. at *5. 
185 Id. at *7. 
186 Id. 
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exonerating innocent persons, and deterring recidivism.187 These 
purposes went beyond the ordinary need for law enforcement, and 
constituted a special need. 
That being the case, the district court then moved on to the 
reasonableness analysis, weighing Hook’s privacy interests against the 
government’s special need.188 Citing Griffin, she held that people on 
conditional release have a greatly diminished expectation of privacy, 
and have no privacy interest in proof of their identities.189 That Hook 
had not explicitly consented to providing a DNA sample as a term of 
his release was of no import—the court stated that this had no effect 
on Hook’s expectation of privacy.190 Judge Lefkow defined the search 
at issue as the extraction of blood, and in accordance with other courts 
held that such an intrusion was minimal.191 Although the government 
in this case did not identify its interests in the DNA collection, the 
judge used the same interests she had identified as providing a special 
need—solving crime, promoting accuracy in the judicial system, and 
reducing recidivism—to find that the government had “several 
important government interests.”192 The district court therefore denied 
Hook’s petition,193 and Hook appealed. 
At the Seventh Circuit, the panel largely agreed with Judge 
Lefkow’s analysis. Prior to diving into the special needs analysis, 
though, the court addressed the issue of consent.194 Hook argued that 
because DNA collection was not included in the original terms of his 
supervised release agreement, he was not required to provide a 
                                                 
187 Id. at *8-9. 
188 Id. at *9-10. 
189 Id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987); United States v. 
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 
1279-80 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
190 Id. at *11 n.3. 
191 Id. at *11. 
192 Id. at *11-12. 
193 Id. at *25. 
194 United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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sample.195 The court remained unpersuaded: “[T]he original term of 
supervised release instituted by the district court required Hook to 
‘follow the instructions of the probation officer’ . . . . In this case, the 
probation officer instructed Hook to submit to DNA collection, and 
this brings the DNA collection into his original sentence.”196 In 
addition, the court noted that the district court held a hearing before 
ordering Hook to comply with the DNA collection. That hearing 
satisfied the conditions precedent to modifying the terms of supervised 
release.197 Hook also argued that there was, in effect, a breach of 
contract—but Hook was sentenced by a jury, and was not on probation 
as the result of a plea agreement. The court found that no contract 
existed.198 
After addressing those arguments, the court analyzed Hook’s 
Fourth Amendment claim. As at the district court, the Seventh Circuit 
felt that the federal DNA act presented issues identical to those in 
Green.199 Hook tried to distinguish Green by noting that Green dealt 
with incarcerated felons, whereas he was only on supervised release—
but the court found that this was “a distinction without difference for 
the purposes of the DNA Act and the Fourth Amendment.”200 
The court acknowledged that other circuits used the 
reasonableness standard, but was not persuaded to change or even 
justify its special needs framework. Instead, the court stated that 
“[w]hile some circuits have employed a reasonableness standard, we 
employed the ‘special needs’ approach in Green and will do the same 
here.”201 Reiterating its Green reasoning, the court again held that the 
purpose of DNA collection was not ordinary law enforcement, but to 




198 Id. at 771. Instead, Hook’s situation is more akin to that in Hagenow, with 
the probation term being a part of the original sentence. See discussion infra section 
III(C). 
199 Hook, 471 F.3d at 772. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 773 (citations omitted). 
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“establish a database of accurate felon identification information and 
to deter recidivism, not to search for information on a specific crime or 
to detect ‘ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’”202 The court also took 
solace in the fact that the federal DNA Act provides penalties for 
unauthorized access to CODIS, and that a probation officer has no 
discretion in deciding whether someone must provide a sample.203 
The purpose of the above reasoning was solely to establish that a 
special need did, in fact, exist. The court did not engage in the 
reasonableness balancing anew—after finding a special need, the court 
simply “appl[ied] the reasoning in Green” and concluded that Hook’s 
DNA collection did not violate the Fourth Amendment.204 
Of course, as noted above, the Green court also failed to engage in 
a detailed balancing of the interests at issue. The court clearly was 
capable of doing so, as it already had in Joy and other special needs 
cases. But as alluded to earlier, the problems in Hook go far beyond a 
mere failure to flesh out important considerations left unresolved in 
Green. In the time between Green and Hook, three opinions made it 
clear that the special needs approach was not the appropriate method 
for determining the constitutionality of DNA collection, at least insofar 
as that collection takes place in the context of supervised releasees. 
The first two of these cases were Seventh Circuit opinions that 
addressed the effect of a waiver, much like the one the court read into 
Hook’s supervised release agreement. 
 
C. Waiver, Barnett, and Hagenow 
 
About a year and a half after the Seventh Circuit issued the Green 
opinion, it took up suspicionless searches again in United States v. 
Barnett.205 The court’s opinion bears little resemblance to Green; 
instead, the court focused almost entirely on the issue of waiver. In 
Barnett, a probationer plea bargained with the government and agreed 
                                                 
202 Id.  
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 415 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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to various probation conditions in lieu of serving prison time.206 One 
of the conditions required Barnett to permit searches of his body, 
home, and any other effects whenever his probation officer requested 
access.207 Barnett agreed, and at some point (the court does not go into 
the facts of the case) his probation officer searched his house and 
found a gun.208 Barnett challenged the blanket waiver of his Fourth 
Amendment rights as unconstitutional—the issue the Supreme Court 
left open in Knights. 
The court quickly disposed of the case, noting that 
“[c]onstitutional rights like other rights can be waived, provided that 
the waiver is knowing and intelligent.”209 Further, plea bargains are a 
form of contract, and are evaluated according to the norms of contract 
interpretation.210 Therefore, the plea bargain had to be interpreted “in 
light of common sense,”211 meaning it implicitly forbade those 
searches having no law enforcement purpose as well as those greatly 
exceeding legitimate law enforcement needs.212 
Finally, Barnett pointed to discrepancies between his particular 
probation agreement (which permitted suspicionless searches) and the 
probation office’s policy manual (which required reasonable suspicion 
of a parole violation or crime). He argued that the policy manual’s 
                                                 
206 Id. at 691. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. Some courts have held that probationers’ blanket waivers of Fourth 
Amendment rights are valid; others have imposed limits on how, if at all, such rights 
may be waived. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this note. See generally Jay 
M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity of Requirement that, as Condition of Probation, 
Defendant Submit to Warrantless Searches, 99 A.L.R. 5TH 557 (2002); Antoine 
McNamara, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 209, 235-36 (2007) (noting that the common counterargument to the Seventh 
Circuit’s Barnett reasoning is the doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions,” but also 
noting that the doctrine itself is the subject of debate). 
210 Barnett, 415 F.3d at 692-93 (citations omitted). 
211 Id. at 692 (quoting McElroy v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 73 F.3d 722, 726-27 
(7th Cir. 1996)). 
212 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981)). 
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terms should be implicitly included in his agreement.213 The court 
deftly dispatched this argument using standard contract construction: if 
an indefinite contract should not be enforced, the court could 
invalidate the plea agreement, thereby placing Barnett back before a 
court for resentencing.214 Since Barnett did not appear to relish this 
option, the court left the contract undisturbed.215 
Less than two months after the Barnett opinion, the Seventh 
Circuit further fleshed out its answer to the Knights question. As in 
Barnett, the probationer in United States v. Hagenow signed a waiver 
permitting suspicionless searches of his person or property.216 The 
court provided a two-pronged response. First, it held that a reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing existed, which alone would validate the 
search.217 Second, it held that under Barnett, a blanket waiver of 
Fourth Amendment rights eliminates any expectation of privacy that a 
probationer might have, which likewise eliminates the need for any 
individualized suspicion.218 This was true even though in Barnett, the 
court used a “plea bargain as contract” approach, whereas in Hagenow 
the probationer did not have a plea bargain, but merely consented to 
searches as a condition of his probation—the waivers were “similar” 
and the same reasoning applied.219 As a result, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the suspicionless search of a probationer who consented to all 
searches as a condition of parole is inherently reasonable. 
Perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this note, the court 
also specifically recognized and disregarded the special needs 
                                                 
213 Id. at 693. 
214 Id. Under this analysis, it would appear that probation office policy manuals 
are meaningless—either the same terms appear in both the manual and the individual 
probationer’s agreement, and no indefiniteness exists; or there are discrepancies 
between the two, and a probationer can challenge the probation agreement only if he 
is willing to give up probation entirely. It is hard to imagine a probationer willing to 
choose that route to make a point. 
215 Id. 
216 423 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2005). 
217 Id. at 642-43. 
218 Id. at 643. 
219 Id. 
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framework.220 Hagenow attacked the search by arguing that Griffin 
required a special need; the Seventh Circuit parried, citing the Knights 
Court’s rejection of this argument.221 The court concluded that 
“[b]ecause Hagenow signed a waiver agreeing to submit to searches 
while on probation, this case falls under Knights and its progeny, not 
Griffin, and the ‘special needs’ test does not apply.”222 
After Barnett and Hagenow, a strong argument can be made that a 
consent-to-search clause in a probation agreement automatically 
renders a suspicionless search constitutional in the Seventh Circuit. 
Further, the Hagenow court specifically cautioned against use of the 
special needs analysis when consent to a search had been given. And 
Green, of course, did not speak to this issue, as the DNA searches in 
that case were performed on prisoners who did not consent to the 
search. 
How does all of this relate to DNA collection? Under federal law, 
a sentencing court that grants a period of supervised release now must 
include “as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the 
defendant cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample” if DNA 
collection is otherwise required under the DNA Analysis Backlog 
Elimination Act.223 Under this DNA Act, samples must be collected 
from anyone convicted of (1) any felony; (2) any offense listed in 
chapter 109A, title 18 of the United States Code; (3) any crime of 
violence, as that term is defined in section 16, title 18 of the United 
                                                 
220 Id. (“[T]he Griffin v. Wisconsin ‘special needs’ doctrine does not apply 
here.”) (citation omitted). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2000). The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act 
of 2000 also states that “[t]he probation office responsible for the supervision under 
Federal law of an individual on probation, parole, or supervised release shall collect 
a DNA sample from each such individual who is, or has been, convicted of a 
qualifying Federal . . . or a qualifying military offense . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14135a(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
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States Code; or (4) any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the 
offenses listed above.224 
Therefore, a person placed on supervised release after the recent 
spate of amendments to the federal DNA statute would necessarily 
have to sign a blanket waiver like those seen in Barnett and 
Hagenow—the person would have to consent to the suspicionless 
search that occurs when DNA is collected.225 In effect, such was the 
case in Hook—as I explained above, at the time Hook was placed on 
supervised release he did not explicitly consent to DNA collection; the 
Seventh Circuit read the DNA collection condition into his agreement. 
Nonetheless, the Hook court did not follow, nor did it even mention, 
Barnett and Hagenow. Instead, the court relied almost exclusively on 
its Green opinion, thereby directly contradicting its own precedent. 
In addition to ignoring its own relevant precedent, the Seventh 
Circuit also failed to account for a Supreme Court opinion that issued 
well in advance of the arguments in Hook. That decision, Samson v. 
California, was anticipated by both Barnett and Hagenow—like 
Barnett and Hagenow, the Samson opinion dealt directly with the 
Supreme Court’s Knights holding. But as with those Seventh Circuit 
opinions, the Hook court ignored Samson—an oversight that is all the 
more inexplicable given that Judge Easterbrook explicitly relied upon 
Knights in his Green concurrence.226 
 
 
                                                 
224 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (as amended by the Justice For All Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203, 118 Stat. 2260). 
225 Failure to consent to such a search is a misdemeanor under the federal DNA 
collection statutes, and the refusing person “shall be punished” as mandated by Title 
18 of the United States Code. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5)(A)–(B). The collecting party 
may “may use or authorize the use of such means as are reasonably necessary to 
detain, restrain, and collect a DNA sample from an individual who refuses to 
cooperate in the collection of the sample.” 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4)(A). This is also 
true in at least some states: in California, for example, “use of reasonable force” is 
appropriate to obtain a sample from an offender that refuses to cooperate. CAL. 
PENAL CODE 298.1(a)–(c) (2007). 
226 Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680-81 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring). 
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D. Survival of Special Needs in Light of Samson v. California 
 
In Samson v. California, the Supreme Court sought to answer a 
question it left open in Knights: “whether a condition of release can so 
diminish or eliminate a released prisoner’s expectation of privacy that 
a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer” would be 
constitutional.227 Under California law, every prisoner eligible for 
parole has to sign an agreement permitting suspicionless searches and 
seizures by a parole officer at any time.228 In Samson, a police officer 
saw Samson, a parolee—one that the officer believed had an 
outstanding warrant—walking down the street.229 When the officer 
stopped Samson, however, Samson told him that no outstanding 
warrant existed.230 The officer verified this information, but still 
decided to search Samson. Upon doing so, the officer discovered 
methamphetamine.231 Samson was charged with possession, and filed 
a motion to suppress on the basis that the search was 
unconstitutional.232 At the trial court, the judge denied Samson’s 
motion to suppress the evidence; the California appellate court 
affirmed that ruling, since in California, a search is reasonable as long 
as it is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.233 
The Supreme Court took up the case to resolve the Knights issue, 
and used the reasonableness framework instead of the special needs 
test in doing so. The Court declined to use the special needs approach 
because “under general Fourth Amendment principles” such an 
analysis was unnecessary.234 The Court reiterated the proper balancing 
test for determining whether a search is reasonable: the test requires 
                                                 
227 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196 (2006). 
228 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (West 2000). 




233 People v. Samson, No. A102394, 2004 WL 2307111, at *1-3 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Oct. 14, 2004). 
234 Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199 n.3. 
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weighing the degree to which the search intrudes on a person’s privacy 
against the degree to which the search promotes a legitimate 
governmental interest.235 Under Knights, the Court had already 
addressed that balancing, and it adopted the same weighing of interests 
in Samson.236 
Moreover, as in Knights, the Court focused on the fact that 
Samson consented to suspicionless searches.237 While that condition 
weighed heavily in the Court’s balancing test (as Samson’s awareness 
that he could be searched at any time served to significantly diminish 
any expectation of privacy that he had), the Court did not rely on the 
consent-to-search condition in Samson’s parolee agreement as the 
basis for its holding.238 This allowed the Court to definitively answer 
the question it left in Knights—the Court’s reasonableness analysis 
alone provided its rationale for holding that the search was 
constitutional.239 
The Court also fleshed out the “continuum” of privacy interests 
that go along with varying punishments in the penal system. In 
Knights, the Court had held that probationers did not enjoy the same 
rights as free citizens; in Samson, the Court further found that parole 
was “more akin” to imprisonment than probation—meaning that a 
parolee has less of an expectation of privacy than a probationer.240 But 
the Court drew the line at the dissent’s characterization of that holding, 
and stated that it did not go so far as to find that parolees had no 
Fourth Amendment rights.241 After weighing Samson’s diminished 
expectation of privacy against important governmental interests such 
                                                 
235 Id. at 2197. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 2199. 
238 Id. at 2199 n.3. 
239 Id. The Court refrained from doing so in part because the California 
Supreme Court had not yet had a chance to construe the statute that required a 
consent-to-search provision in any parolee’s agreement. Id. 
240 Id. at 2197-98. Note that under the current federal sentencing guidelines, 
parole has been replaced by supervised release. See supra notes 21 and 82 and 
accompanying text. 
241 Id. at 2198. 
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as supervising parolees and reducing recidivism, the Court concluded 
that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.242 
After Samson, how could the Seventh Circuit still believe the 
special needs approach was appropriate? After all, Hook was a 
supervised releasee and the court interpreted his agreement to include 
DNA collection. One answer could lie in the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning. The Second Circuit, along with the Tenth Circuit, had 
previously joined the Seventh in applying the special needs framework 
to DNA collection. In United States v. Amerson, the Second Circuit 
revisited DNA collection.243 Contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach, the Second Circuit realized that Samson warranted 
discussion. Interestingly, in Amerson the Second Circuit held that the 
special needs test remained viable.244 But the Amerson case dealt with 
two probationers, and the court strictly limited its reading of Samson, 
noting: 
 
While after Samson it can no longer be said that ‘the 
Supreme Court has never applied a general 
balancing test to a suspicionless-search regime,’ 
nothing in Samson suggests that a general balancing 
test should replace special needs as the primary 
mode of analysis of suspicionless searches outside 
the context of the highly diminished expectation of 
privacy presented in Samson. . . . [T]he Supreme 
Court has not, to date, held that the expectations of 
privacy of probationers are sufficiently diminished 
to permit probationer suspicionless searches to be 
tested by a general balancing test . . . .245 
 
Even under Amerson’s rejection of the reasonableness test, then, 
Hook’s DNA collection would have been analyzed under the 
                                                 
242 Id. at 2200-02. 
243 483 F.3d 73 (2007). 
244 Id. at 89. 
245 Id. at 79 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
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reasonableness test, since Hook, like Samson, was on supervised 
release (or parole, depending on the language of the jurisdiction). 
The Tenth Circuit also found that Samson modified its 
suspicionless search law. In United States v. Freeman, that court 
reinterpreted the Griffin line of cases.246 It limited the special needs 
test to apply only to those searches conducted by a parole officer, 
because it felt that the rehabilitative relationship between officer and 
parolee was key to Griffin’s reasoning.247 The Tenth Circuit still 
shifted its position on the special needs test post-Samson, however, 
holding that suspicionless searches by “ordinary law enforcement 
officers” would be evaluated under the reasonableness test.248 
Perhaps, then, Freeman could provide some justification for the 
outcome of Hook, since Hook’s DNA collection was at the behest of 
his parole officer—but the Seventh Circuit’s own case law forecloses 
that avenue. Although Barnett relied upon the existence of a plea 
agreement to interpret the consent-to-search provisions as part of a 
contract, Hagenow had no such limitation—Hagenow had no plea 
agreement, but the Seventh Circuit held that Hagenow’s waiver alone 
made the search reasonable. Further, both Hagenow and Barnett were 
probationers, and under Samson they both have a greater expectation 
of privacy than the supervised releasee in Hook. 
Finally, under the Tenth Circuit’s Freeman holding, if the court in 
Hook had not read DNA collection into the terms of Hook’s probation 
agreement, the outcome might have been different—in Hook’s case. 
Going forward, such reasoning is bound to fail since the federal DNA 
collection statutes now require consent to DNA collection in every 
eligible supervised releasee’s agreement.249 While the federal 
government and some state governments may require some amount of 
                                                 
246 479 F.3d 743 (10th Cir. 2007). 
247 Id. at 748. 
248 Id. 
249 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2000) (“The court shall order, as an explicit condition 
of supervised release, that the defendant cooperate in the collection of a DNA 
sample . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
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individualized suspicion before searching in other cases,250 the federal 
government is the entity that requires a suspicionless search in the 
context of DNA collection. Every agreement will operate to bring the 
supervised releasee into the confines of Hagenow and Samson. 
Since the reasonableness test probably should have applied in 
Hook, and will apply in any case where a supervised releasee consents 
(as required by federal law) to DNA collection, the Seventh Circuit 
erred in applying the special needs test to Hook’s case. But beyond 
using the wrong framework to analyze DNA collection, the court 
further erred in failing to engage in a careful balancing of the relevant 
interests at stake. The special needs test collapses into the 
reasonableness test once a “special need” is identified251—had the 
court carefully considered the privacy interests at stake in Green and 
Hook, much of that reasoning would remain viable upon adoption of 
the proper reasonableness test. Instead, the Seventh Circuit must 
evaluate the reasonableness factors anew. Upon doing so, the court 
may conclude that DNA collection as mandated by federal law is 
unconstitutional with respect to probationers, and perhaps even for 
persons on supervised release. 
 
IV. BALANCING INTERESTS IN FEDERAL DNA COLLECTION 
 
The next time the Seventh Circuit is presented with the DNA 
collection of a federal probationer or a supervised releasee, the 
Seventh Circuit should disclaim the special needs test and adopt the 
reasonableness framework. In doing so, it is key that the Seventh 
Circuit engage in a careful weighing of the interests involved, since 
                                                 
250 Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201; see also Freeman, 479 F.3d at 748 (“The Court 
[in Samson] noted ‘that some States and the Federal Government require a level of 
individualized suspicion,’ and strongly implied that in such jurisdictions a 
suspicionless search would remain impermissible. Parolee searches are therefore an 
example of the rare instance in which the contours of a federal constitutional right 
are determined, in part, by the content of state law.”) (quoting Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 
2201). 
251 See the discussion of United States v. Amerson in the Second Circuit, supra 
Part II(A). 
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many of the assumptions in Green and Hook no longer hold true. For 
instance, in Samson the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that 
persons on supervised release are closer to prisoners in their privacy 
interests; while it is clear that probationers likewise have a diminished 
expectation of privacy, it is not clear how a probationer’s interest will 
compare to a supervised releasee’s interest. In Hook, however, the 
Seventh Circuit rejected Hook’s attempt to distinguish between 
Green’s incarcerated prisoners and himself, stated that no distinction 
existed between those in custody and those on supervised release.252 
Under the reasonableness approach, DNA collection may not pass 
constitutional muster for probationers or supervised releasees. As the 
Supreme Court reiterated in Samson, the reasonableness of a search is 
determined by weighing the degree of intrusion on an individual’s 
privacy against the degree to which the search is needed to promote 
legitimate governmental interests.253 Before weighing the interests 
involved, however, the Seventh Circuit should first reevaluate which 
search is at issue. 
Courts analyzing DNA collection have largely focused on the 
initial blood draw as the relevant Fourth Amendment search. But as 
mentioned above, some courts have held that more than one search 
takes place when DNA is collected: first, the physical drawing of 
blood (or swabbing of cheek cells, or similar method for obtaining 
DNA); and second, the subsequent biochemical analysis of that 
sample.254 On the other hand, some courts have held that if the initial 
                                                 
252 United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Griffin for 
the observation that supervised releasees, like probationers, are not entitled to the 
same absolute liberty to which a citizen is entitled.). 
253 Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2197. 
254 E.g., United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276 (D. Mass. 2007); 
Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1254 (N.D. Okla. 2006); State v. Transou, 
201 S.W.3d 607, 619 (Tenn. 2006) (citations omitted). Although some probationers 
or parolees further argue that every comparison of their DNA against other samples 
via CODIS is an additional search, this reasoning has not been adopted by a court. 
E.g., Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that “the 
consequences of the contrary conclusion would be staggering”).  
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search is lawful, any later use of the evidence is not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.255 
Which search the court analyzes has serious implications in a 
balancing of the privacy interests at stake. In other contexts, the 
Seventh Circuit has recognized that more than one search may occur 
within the same series of events, and that each search must be 
evaluated individually.256 Courts are disingenuous when they support 
the outcome of their balancing tests based only on the privacy interests 
implicated in the search that occurs when a DNA sample is 
obtained.257 Instead, the Seventh Circuit should evaluate the “second 
search” that occurs when the DNA sample undergoes processing and is 
uploaded into the CODIS system. If the court does so, it is bound to 
find that the privacy interests at stake shift dramatically. 
Unlike fingerprints, it cannot properly be said that “the DNA 
profile derived from [a] defendant’s blood sample establishes only a 
record of the defendant’s identity—otherwise personal information in 
which the qualified offender can claim no right of privacy once 
lawfully convicted of a qualifying offense.”258 Moreover, in the 
chemical analysis of other bodily tissues or fluids, the privacy interests 
are relatively minimal—the analysis typically provides an answer to 
such questions as whether a person has been drinking or using illegal 
drugs. That may not be the case in DNA analysis—it has, at the very 
least, the potential to reveal much more. Although a DNA profile is 
theoretically comprised of “non-coding” or “junk” DNA—DNA 
regions selected because those DNA sequences were not associated 
                                                 
255 E.g., A.A. v. Attorney General, 914 A.2d 260, 266-67 (N.J. 2007) (citing 
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987)). 
256 E.g., United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 864-66 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(analyzing a traffic stop, a search that does not require reasonable suspicion, and the 
subsequent pat-down search, which does, as two distinct searches). 
257 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“The search in question, however, constitutes far more of 
an intrusion than the mere insertion of a needle into an individual’s body and the 
consequent extraction of a blood sample.”). 
258 Id. at 837 (majority opinion). 
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with physical or medical characteristics259—the notion that any DNA 
is purely “junk” has been strongly refuted.260 Professor Cole clarifies 
the distinction between non-coding DNA and functional DNA: 
functional DNA actually performs a specific, identifiable function in 
the body, whereas non-coding DNA does not yield specific physical 
traits.261 But while non-coding DNA may not be “functional” in the 
traditional sense, it can indicate a propensity for physical traits, 
thereby creating privacy concerns.262 These concerns extend to the 
short tandem repeat sequences, or STRs, that are uploaded into 
CODIS.263 STRs are non-coding portions of DNA, but those 
sequences may nevertheless yield information about an individual, 
such as whether an individual has a propensity toward particular 
genetic diseases. While some argue that none of the sequences used in 
forensic STR have been found to be predictive, other STR sequences 
                                                 
259 United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 106-900(I) (2000)). 
260 E.g., ‘Junk’ DNA Now Looks Like Powerful Regulator, Scientists Find, SCI. 
DAILY, Apr. 24, 2007, 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/04/070423185538.htm; Julianna 
Kettlewell, ‘Junk’ Throws Up Precious Secret, BBC NEWS, May 12, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3703935.stm; Helen Pearson, ‘Junk’ DNA 
Reveals Vital Role, NATURE NEWS, May 7, 2004, 
http://www.nature.com/news/2004/040503/full/news040503-9.html; Not ‘Junk DNA’ 
After All: Tiny RNAs Play Big Role Controlling Genes, SCI. DAILY, Oct. 26, 2007, 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071025112059.htm; Paul Rincon, 
Salvage Prospect for ‘Junk’ DNA, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/ 4940654.stm; Scientists Explore Function 
of ‘Junk DNA,’ SCI. DAILY, Nov. 21, 2006, 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/11/061113180029.htm. 
261 Simon Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 54 (2007), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2007/09/is-the-
junk-dna.html. 
262 Id. at 56-57. 
263 See notes and accompanying text supra note 32 and 33. The entirety of a 
person’s DNA sequence is not uploaded into CODIS. Instead, only those thirteen 
specific STR sequences chosen by the FBI for identification purposes are uploaded 
into CODIS. 
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have proven useful in tracking genetic diseases.264 As Judge Gould in 
the Ninth Circuit noted, “the threat of a loss of privacy is real, even if 
we cannot yet discern the full scope of the problem.”265 The privacy 
interests implicated in STR DNA sequences are hotly debated,266 and 
these interests deserve at the very least a closer exploration in the 
Seventh Circuit. 
In addition, the DNA sequences in CODIS can also yield 
information about people in Judge Easterbrook’s “fourth category”—
those who have never been convicted or arrested of a crime. CODIS 
yields the best matches, not only “identical” matches, and a forensic 
expert takes those matches and draws conclusions based upon personal 
examination. In at least one instance, a near-match in CODIS led the 
investigators to suspect not the individual whose sample was included 
in the system, but a close relative—in that case, a brother.267 The 
potential for CODIS to yield genetic information about those never 
convicted of a crime raises unique privacy concerns—many of the 
courts, and indeed the Seventh Circuit, have recognized that a free 
citizen has a much greater expectation of privacy than one convicted 
of a crime, and free citizens generally cannot be subjected to searches 
                                                 
264 Cole, supra note 261, at 58-59 (citing David H. Kaye, Science Fiction and 
Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62 (2006), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2006/7/; Colin Kimpton et al., 
Report on the Second EDNAP Collaborative STR Exercise, 71 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 
137 (1995)). 
265 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 842 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., 
concurring). 
266 See, e.g., TANIA SIMONCELLI & SHELDON KRIMSKY, A NEW ERA OF DNA 
COLLECTIONS: AT WHAT COST TO CIVIL LIBERTIES? (2007), 
http://www.acslaw.org/node/5338; Colloquy, Privacy Risks of DNA Archiving, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62 (2006), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/prior-colloquies/junk-
dna.html; Symposium, DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties, 34 J.L. & MED. 
ETHICS 147 (2006). 
267 Heather Bennett, Comment, Taking the “Banks” Out of Banks v. Gonzales: 
DNA Databanks and the Fourth Amendment Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches 
and Seizures, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 547, 573-74 (2007) (citing 
Flowers v. Indiana, 654 N.E.2d 1124, 1124 (Ind. 1995)). 
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without a warrant or probable cause.268 DNA collections clearly raise 
issues that are not properly addressed when a court focuses only on the 
initial DNA collection. 
Many commentators have identified additional concerns in the 
context of DNA searches. Some have expressed concern over the fact 
that once a person has served the entirety of his sentence, the DNA 
profile in CODIS nevertheless remains active.269 This indefinite 
retention belies the fact that expectations of privacy vary over the 
course of one’s sentence (from incarceration, to supervised release, to 
probation).270 Further, DNA collection from all offenders, regardless 
of offense, “does not necessarily serve the government’s interests 
equally.”271 In Hook, for example, the supervised releasee was a white 
collar criminal: the chance of his DNA ever being left at a future crime 
scene is slim to none. Persuasive arguments also have been made that 
white collar criminals do not re-offend at the same rates,272 yet the 
Seventh Circuit failed to account for this possibility in looking at the 
government’s interests. And as alluded to previously, it may well be 
necessary to draw different conclusions when balancing the 
expectations of privacy for supervised releasees as compared to 
probationers, much as the Second Circuit did in Amerson. The 
Supreme Court’s Samson holding indicates that the expectations of 
privacy may vary substantially between these two classes. 
                                                 
268 See United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 
Knights and Griffin for the proposition that “[t]hose under supervised release do not 
enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional 
liberty properly dependent on observance of special restrictions.”). 
269 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 841-42 (Gould, J., concurring). 
270 Eric May, Who’s Next? The Continued Expansion of DNA Databases in 
United States v. Kincade, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 113 (2007). 
271 Id. 
272 Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 279 
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/02/21/podgor.html. But see Andrew 
Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes, 
116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 286 (2007), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2007/02/21/weissmann_block.html. 
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In light of the unique considerations that go hand-in-hand with 
DNA, the Seventh Circuit needs to engage in a detailed, fresh look at 
DNA collection. If the court embraces the special concerns inherent to 
DNA information, it is bound to find that the privacy interests in DNA 
searches look quite different than those the court considered (or failed 




The Seventh Circuit erred in using the special needs approach to 
evaluate the constitutionality of a supervised releasee’s DNA 
collection. At the time the court decided Green, the state of the 
Supreme Court’s suspicionless search jurisprudence was decidedly 
confusing, and the Green court can be forgiven for applying the 
special needs test. After Barnett, Hagenow, and Samson, however, 
both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court had effectively closed 
the door on the special needs framework as a method for analyzing 
searches like the one in Hook. The Seventh Circuit should account for 
those cases by adopting the reasonableness approach when next it 
analyzes DNA collection. Further, where a supervised releasee 
consents to a suspicionless search, as will be the case for every 
qualifying federal felon subject to the federal DNA collection statutes, 
Samson dictates that the consent operates to diminish the releasee’s 
expectation of privacy so much that a suspicionless search becomes 
inherently reasonable. Under the Second Circuit’s Amerson holding, 
the Seventh Circuit may still be able to apply the special needs test to 
DNA collection from probationers. Regardless of the test used, 
however, the balancing of interests that a court must engage in remains 
relatively unchanged—and if the interests are properly weighed, the 
result is that DNA collection from either a supervised releasee or a 
probationer may very well be unconstitutional. 
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